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Abstract
In this paper, we study optimal actuator location of the minimum norm controls for a multi-
dimensional heat equation with control defined in the space Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)). The actuator
domain ω is quite general in the sense that it is required only to have a prescribed Lebesgue
measure. A relaxation problem is formulated and is transformed into a two-person zero-sum
game problem. By the game theory, we develop a necessary and sufficient condition and the
existence of relaxed optimal actuator location for p ∈ [2,+∞], which is characterized by the
Nash equilibrium of the associated game problem. An interesting case is for the case of p = 2,
for which it is shown that the classical optimal actuator location can be obtained from the
relaxed optimal actuator location without additional condition. Finally for p = 2, a sufficient
and necessary condition for classical optimal actuator location is presented.
Keywords: Heat equation, optimal control, optimal location, game theory, Nash equilib-
rium.
AMS subject classifications: 35K05, 49J20, 65K210, 90C47, 93C20.
1 Introduction and main results
Different to lumped parameter systems, the location of actuator where optimal control optimizes
the performance in systems governed by partial differential equations (PDEs) can often be chosen
([14]). Using a simple duct model, it is shown in [13] that the noise reduction performance depends
strongly on actuator location. An approximation scheme is developed in [14] to find optimal location
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of the optimal controls for abstract infinite-dimensional systems to minimize cost functional with
the worst choice of initial condition. In fact, the actuator location problem has been attracted
widely by many researchers in different contexts but most of them are for one-dimensional PDEs,
as previously studied elsewhere [4, 6, 10, 11, 20, 22], to name just a few. Numerical research is one
of the most important perspectives [4, 15, 18, 19, 23], among many others.
However, there are few results available in the literature for multi-dimensional PDEs. In [16], a
problem of optimizing the shape and position of the damping set for internal stabilization of a linear
wave equation in RN , N = 1, 2 is considered. The paper [17] considers a numerical approximation
of null controls of the minimal L∞-norm for a linear heat equation with a bounded potential. An
interesting study is presented in [20] where the problem of determining a measurable subset of
maximizing the L2 norm of the restriction of the corresponding solution to a homogeneous wave
equation on a bounded open connected subset over a finite time interval is addressed. In [9], the
shape optimal design problems related to norm optimal and time optimal of null controlled heat
equation have been considered. However, the controlled domains in [9] are limited to some special
class of open subsets measured by the Hausdorff metric. The same limitations can also be found
in shape optimization problems discussed in [7, 8]. Very recently, some optimal shape and location
problems of sensors for parabolic equations with random initial data have been considered in [21].
In this paper, we consider optimal actuator location of the minimal norm controls for a multi-
dimensional internal null controllable heat equation over an open bounded domain Ω in Rn space.
Our internal actuator domains are quite general: They are varying over all possible measurable
subsets ω of Ω where ω is only required to have a prescribed measure. This work is different from
[21] yet one result (Theorem 1.3) can be considered as a refined multi-dimensional generalization
of paper [19] where one-dimensional problem is considered.
Let us first state our problem. Suppose that Ω ⊂ Rd (d ≥ 1) is a non-empty bounded domain
with C2-boundary ∂Ω. Let T > 0, y0(·) ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0}, a(·, ·) ∈ L∞(Ω × (0, T )), and α ∈ (0, 1).
Denote by
W = {ω ⊂ Ω ∣∣ ω is Lebesque measurable with m(ω) = α ·m(Ω)} , (1.1)
where m(·) is the Lebesgue measure on Rd. For any ω ∈ W and p ∈ (1,+∞], consider the following
controlled heat equation

yt(x, t)−∆y(x, t) + a(x, t)y(x, t) = χω(x)u(x, t) in Ω× (0, T ),
y(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T ),
y(x, 0) = y0(x) in Ω,
(1.2)
where u(·, ·) ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)) is the control, and χω(·) is the characteristic function of ω. For
simplicity, we also denote χω(·) ∈ W when ω ∈ W. It is well known that for any u(·, ·) ∈
Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)), Equation (1.2) admits a unique mild solution which is denoted by y(·;ω, u).
The minimal norm control problem can be stated as follows. For a given time T > 0 and ω ∈ W,
find a minimal norm control to solve the following optimal control problem:
(NP )p,ω : Np(ω) , inf
{‖u‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ∣∣ y(T ;ω, u) = 0}. (1.3)
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A classical optimal actuator location of the minimal norm control problem is to seek an ω¯ ∈ W to
minimize Np(ω):
Np(ω¯) = inf
ω∈W
Np(ω). (1.4)
If such an ω¯ exists, we say that ω¯ is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm
controls. Any u¯ ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)) that satisfies y(T ;ω, u¯) = 0 and ‖u¯‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) = Np(ω¯) is
called an optimal control with respect to the optimal actuator location ω¯.
The existence of optimal actuator location ω¯ is generally not guaranteed because of absence of
the compactness of W. For this reason, we consider instead a relaxed problem. Define
B =
{
β ∈ L(Ω; [0, 1])
∣∣∣ ∫
Ω
β2(x)dx = α ·m(Ω)
}
, (1.5)
where L(Ω; [0, 1]) consists of all Lebesgue measurable functions in Ω with values in [0, 1]. Note that
the set B is a relaxation to the set {χω
∣∣ ω ∈ W} by observing that for any ω ∈ W, β(·) = χω(·) ∈ B,
yet B is not anyhow the convex closure of {χω
∣∣ ω ∈ W}. Most often in what follows, we drop
bracket by simply using β to denote the function β(·). This remark is also is applied to other
functions in some places when there is no risk of arising the confusion.
For any β ∈ B, consider the following system:

yt(x, t)−∆y(x, t) + a(x, t)y(x, t) = β(x)u(x, t) in Ω× (0, T ),
y(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
y(x, 0) = y0(x) in Ω,
(1.6)
where once again the control u(·, ·) ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)). Denote the solution of (1.6) by y(·;β, u) as
counterpart of y(·;ω, u) but with obvious different meaning. Accordingly, the problem (NP )p,ω is
changed into a relaxation problem of the following:
(NP )p,β : Np(β) , inf
{‖u‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ∣∣ y(T ;β, u) = 0}, (1.7)
and the classical problem (1.4) is also relaxed to the following problem
Np(β¯) = inf
β∈B
Np(β). (1.8)
Any solution β¯ to problem (1.8) is called a relaxed optimal actuator location. If there is β¯ = χω¯
solves problem (1.8), then ω¯ is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm controls.
Our main approach is based on the two-person zero-sum game theory. If we are minimizing
the cost with two variable functions u(·, ·) and β(·) one after another, then problem (1.8) can be
written as
inf
β∈B
inf
u∈Dβ
‖u‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) where Dβ = {u ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω))
∣∣ y(T ;β, u) = 0}. (1.9)
This is a typical two-level optimization problem yet not a game problem. Indeed, in the framework
of two-person zero-sum game theory, any Stackelberg game problem which is also called leader-
follower game problem (see, e.g., [25]) should be of the form:
inf
x∈E
sup
y∈F
J(x, y) or sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
J(x, y),
3
where it is required that the set E is independent of the set F . It is interesting that we can
use the relationship between problem (NP )p,β (1.7) and its dual problem which is a variational
problem when β = χω ([12]) to transform the problem (1.9) into a Stackelberg game problem in the
framework of two-person zero-sum game theory, which gives in turn the solution of our problem.
The main result of this paper is the following Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1. For any given p ∈ [2,+∞] with q being its conjugate exponent: 1/p+1/q = 1, there
exists at least one solution to problem (1.8). In addition, β¯ is a solution to problem (1.8) if and
only if there is ψ¯ ∈ Yq such that (β¯, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium of the following two-person zero-sum
game problem: Find (β¯, ψ¯) ∈ B × Yq such that[
1
2
∥∥β¯ψ¯(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉
]
= sup
β∈B
[
1
2
∥∥βψ¯(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉
]
,[
1
2
∥∥β¯ψ¯(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉
]
= inf
ψ∈Yq
[
1
2
∥∥β¯ψ(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉
]
.
(1.10)
where Y q is defined in Definition 3.24 in section 3.2.3.
Remark 1.2. The above necessary and sufficient condition is characterized by the Nash equilibrium
of the associated game problem. Furthermore, for any solution β¯ to problem (1.8), the set{
ψˆ ∈ Yq
∣∣ (β¯, ψˆ) is a Nash equilibrium} (1.11)
is a singleton and independent of β¯. Indeed, the set defined in (1.11) equals to {ψ¯} where ψ¯ is the
unique solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Based on this fact, we can present a necessary condition
to characterize any solution β¯ in an alternative way in case the Nash equilibrium is not easy to be
determined. That is, if β¯ is a solution to problem (1.8), then β¯ solves the following problem:
sup
β∈B
∥∥βψ¯(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
. (1.12)
All results are illustrated in Remark 3.29 in section 3.2.3.
The case of p = 2 is of special interest. In this case, the solution of the classical problem (1.4)
can be obtained from the associated relaxation problem (1.8).
Theorem 1.3. Let p = 2 and let ψ¯ be the unique solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Then there
exists at least one ω¯ ∈ W such that
N2(ω¯) = inf
ω∈W
N2(ω) = N2(β¯) = inf
β∈B
N2(β),
where β¯ = χω¯. Moreover, ω¯ is an optimal actuator location of the optimal minimal norm controls
if and only if ω¯ solves the problem following
sup
ω∈W
∥∥χωf¯∥∥2L2(Ω),
where f¯(x) =
∫ T
0
ψ¯2(x, t)dt.
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We proceed as follows. In section 2, we formulate the problem (1.8) into a two-person zero-
sum Stackelberg game problem. Several equivalent forms are presented. Section 3 is devoted to the
proof of the main results, where in subsection 3.1, we discuss the relaxed problem, and in subsection
3.2 we discuss the associated two-person zero-sum game problem. Subsection 3.2.1 presents the
existence of the relaxed optimal location, and subsection 3.2.2 discusses the value of the two-person
zero-sum game. The Nash equilibrium is investigated in subsection 3.2.3. We end section 3.2 by
presenting the proof of Theorem 1.1. In subsection 3.3, we discuss the case of p = 2. We conclude
the context by presenting the proof of Theorem 1.3.
2 From relaxation problem to game problem
Suppose that the p ∈ (1,+∞] is fixed, β ∈ B, and q is the conjugate exponent of p: 1p + 1q = 1.
Now let us consider the dual problem of (NP )p,β. Consider the dual system of (1.6):

ϕt(x, t) + ∆ϕ(x, t) − a(x, t)ϕ(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ϕ(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
ϕ(x, T ) = z(x) in Ω,
yϕ(x, t) = β(x)ϕ(x, t) in Ω× (0, T ),
(2.1)
where z ∈ L2(Ω) is given and yϕ(x, t) is the output of (2.1). We denote the solution of (2.1) by
ϕ(·; z).
Introduce the functional:
J(z;β, q)
∆
=
1
2
‖βϕ(·; z)‖2Lq (0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0, ϕ(0; z) 〉, (2.2)
and propose the following variational problem:
(Min J)β,q : Vq(β) = inf
z∈L2(Ω)
J(z;β, q). (2.3)
The following Lemma 2.1 whose proof is presented at the end of section 3.1 gives a relation
between problems (NP )p,β (1.7) and (Min J)β,q (2.3), which enable us to formulate the problem
(1.8) into a two-person zero-game problem.
Lemma 2.1. Let β ∈ B and y0 ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0}. Let Np(β) and Vq(β) be defined by (1.8) and (2.3)
respectively. Then
Vq(β) = −1
2
Np(β)
2. (2.4)
Remark 2.2. When β = χω for ω ∈ W, the corresponding equality (2.4) has been verified in [24].
Here we establish it for our relaxation problem.
To transform problem (1.8) into a game problem by (2.4), we need to introduce two spaces. Let
Y = {ϕ(·; z)| z ∈ L2(Ω)}, (2.5)
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where ϕ(·; z) is the solution of (2.1) with the initial value z ∈ L2(Ω). Obviously, Y is a linear space
from the linearity of PDE (2.1).
With Lemma 2.1 and space Y , it turns out immediately that the problem (1.8) is actually a
minimax problem. Precisely, to solve problem (1.8), we only need to consider the following problem:
sup
β∈B
−1
2
Np(β)
2 = sup
β∈B
Vq(β). (2.6)
By the definition of Vq(β) in (2.3), the problem (2.6) is equivalent to the following problem:
sup
β∈B
inf
z∈L2(Ω)
[
1
2
‖βϕ(·; z)‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0, ϕ(0, z) 〉
]
.
Furthermore, by the definition (2.5), the problem above is equivalent to the following problem:
sup
β∈B
inf
ψ∈Y
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0,Tβ,q(βψ) 〉
]
,
where Tβ,q : βY β,q → L2(Ω) is a compact operator which will be specified later in (3.11) with
Y ⊂ Y β,q and Tβ,q(βψ) = ψ(0) for any ψ ∈ Y . To sum up, we have obtained the following
equivalences:
inf
β∈B
Np(β)
m
sup
β∈B
−1
2
Np(β)
2 = sup
β∈B
Vq(β)
m
sup
β∈B
inf
z∈L2(Ω)
[
1
2
‖βϕ(·; z)‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0, ϕ(0, z) 〉
]
(2.7)
m
sup
β∈B
inf
ψ∈Y
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0,Tβ,q(βψ) 〉
]
. (2.8)
Remark 2.3. We note that if the optimal solutions to problems (1.8), (2.7), and (2.8) exist, then
they are the same. In addition, the existence of solution to problem (2.7) means that there exists
β¯ ∈ B such that
inf
z∈L2(Ω)
[
1
2
∥∥β¯ϕ(·; z)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ϕ(0, z) 〉
]
= sup
β∈B
inf
z∈L2(Ω)
[
1
2
‖βϕ(·; z)‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0, ϕ(0, z) 〉
]
.
Similar remark can be made to the solution of (2.8).
The problem (2.8) is a typical Stackelberg game problem which has the following equivalent
form:
(GP1): sup
β∈B
inf
ψ∈Y
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 βT ∗β,qy0, ψ 〉
]
. (2.9)
6
To solve the game problem arisen from problem (GP1) (2.9), we need to put into the framework
of two-person zero-sum game theory. Let us recall some basic facts of the two-person zero-sum game
problem. There are two players: Emil and Frances. Emil takes his strategy x from his strategy
set E and Frances takes his strategy y from his strategy set F . Let f : E × F be the index cost
function. Emil wants to minimize the function F while Frances wants to maximize F . In the
framework of two-person zero-sum game, the solution to (2.9) is called a Stackelberg equilibrium.
The most important concept for two-person zero-sum game is the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. Suppose that E and F are strategy sets of Emil and Frances, respectively. Let
f : E × F 7→ R be an index cost functional. We call (x¯, y¯) ∈ E × F to be a Nash equilibrium if,
f(x¯, y) ≤ f(x¯, y¯) ≤ f(x, y¯), ∀ x ∈ E, y ∈ F.
The following result is well known, see, for instance, Proposition 8.1 of [1, p.121]. It connects
the Stackelberg equilibrium with the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5. The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) (x¯, y¯) is a Nash equilibrium;
(ii) V + = V − and x¯ solves the following problem (or equivalently, x¯ is a Stackelberg equilibrium
associated):
inf
x∈E
sup
y∈F
f(x, y), i.e. sup
y∈F
f(x¯, y) = V +,
and y¯ solves the following problem (or equivalently, y¯ is a Stackelberg equilibrium associated):
sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
f(x, y), i.e. inf
x∈E
f(x, y¯) = V −,
where
V +
∆
= inf
x∈E
sup
y∈F
f(x, y), V − ∆= sup
y∈F
inf
x∈E
f(x, y). (2.10)
When V + = V −, we say that the game problem attains its value V + = V −.
Returning back to our problem (GP1) (2.9), it is seen that the index cost function is defined by
F (θ, ψ) = −1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) − 〈βT ∗β,qy0, ψ〉, (2.11)
The first player who controls the function β ∈ B wants to minimize F while the second player who
controls the function ψ ∈ Y wants to maximize F . Thus we can discuss problem (GP1) (2.9) in
the framework of two-person zero-sum game.
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3 Proof of the main results
First of all, let us recall the null controllability for the controlled system (1.6).
Lemma 3.1. The system (1.6) is null controllable if and only if the dual system (2.1) is exactly
observable: There exists positive constant Cq,α such that
‖ϕ(0; z)‖L2(Ω) ≤ Cq,α ‖βϕ(·; z)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ,∀ z ∈ L2(Ω) and β ∈ B. (3.1)
The inequality of (3.1) is referred as the “observability inequality” for system (2.1).
Proof. When β = χω, it is well known that system (1.6) is null controllable if and only if the
“observability inequality” holds for dual system (2.1): There exists Cˆq,b > 0 such that
‖ϕ(0; z)‖L2(Ω) ≤ Cˆq,b ‖χωϕ(·; z)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ,∀ z ∈ L2(Ω) and m(ω) ≥ b > 0, (3.2)
with some constant b. In addition, Cˆq,b is monotone decreasing with respect to b yet Cˆq,b is
independent of ω. For any β ∈ B, let
λ =
m
(
β(x) ≥√α/2)
m(Ω)
.
By
1 ·m
(
β(x) ≥
√
α/2
)
+ α/2 ·m
(
β(x) <
√
α/2
)
≥
∫
β(x)≥
√
α/2
β2(x)dx+
∫
β(x)<
√
α/2
β2(x)dx
=
∫
Ω
β2(x)dx = α ·m(Ω),
it follows that
λ ·m(Ω) + α/2(1 − λ) ·m(Ω) ≥ α ·m(Ω).
Consequently, λ ≥ α
2− α. We thus have
m
(
β(x) ≥
√
α/2
)
≥ α
2− α ·m(Ω), ∀ β ∈ B. (3.3)
It then follows from (3.2) with ω = {β(x) ≥√α/2} that
‖ϕ(0; z)‖L2(Ω) ≤ Cˆq,λ
∥∥∥χ{β(x)≥√α/2}ϕ(·; z)
∥∥∥
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
≤ Cˆq,λ
∥∥∥∥∥χ{β(x)≥√α/2} β(x)√α/2ϕ(·; z)
∥∥∥∥∥
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
=
√
2Cˆq,λ√
α
∥∥∥χ{β(x)≥√α/2}β(x)ϕ(·; z)
∥∥∥
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
≤
√
2Cˆq,λ√
α
‖β(x)ϕ(·; z)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
=
√
2Cˆq, α
2−α√
α
‖β(x)ϕ(·; z)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
∆
= Cq,α ‖βϕ(·; z)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) .
This is (3.1).
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Remark 3.2. Following from the proof of Lemma 3.1, the constant Cq,α in inequality (3.1) is
independent of β ∈ B.
3.1 Relaxed case
To introduce the operator Tβ,q in (2.8), we introduce two spaces first.
Lemma 3.3. Let Y be defined by (2.5). For each β ∈ B, define a function in Y by
F0(ϕ) = ‖βϕ‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)), ∀ ϕ ∈ Y.
Then (Y, F0) is a linear normed space. We denote this normed space by Yβ,q.
Proof. It suffices to show that F0(ψ) = ‖βψ‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) = 0 implies ψ = 0. Actually, by (3.3),√
α/2‖χ{β(x)≥√α/2}ψ‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ ‖βψ‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) = 0.
By the unique continuation (see, e.g., [3]) for heat equation, we arrive at ψ = 0.
Denote by
Y β,q = the completion of the space Yβ,q. (3.4)
It is usually hard to characterize Y β,q. However, we have the following description for Y β,q.
Lemma 3.4. Let 1 ≤ q < ∞, β ∈ B, and let Y β,q be defined by (3.4). Then under an isometric
isomorphism, any element of Y β,q can be expressed as a function ϕˆ ∈ C([0, T );L2(Ω)) which satisfies
(in the sense of weak solution){
ϕˆt(x, t) + ∆ϕˆ(x, t)− a(x, t)ϕˆ(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ϕˆ(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
(3.5)
and βϕˆ = lim
n→∞βϕ(·; zn) for some sequence {zn} ⊂ L
2(Ω) in Lq(0, T ;L2(Ω)), where ϕ(·; zn) is the
solution of (2.1) with initial value z = zn.
Proof. Let ψ ∈ (Y β,q, F¯0), where (Y β,q, F¯0) is the completion of (Yβ,q, F0). By the definition, there
is a sequence {zn} in L2(Ω) such that
F¯0(ϕ(·; zn)− ψ)→ 0,
from which, one has
F0 (ϕ(·; zn)− ϕ(·; zm)) = F¯0(ϕ(·; zn)− ϕ(·; zm))→ 0 as n,m→∞.
In other words,
‖βϕ(·; zn)− βϕ(·; zm)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) → 0 as n,m→∞. (3.6)
Hence, there exists ψˆ ∈ Lq(0, T ;L2(Ω)) such that
βϕ(·; zn)→ ψˆ strongly in Lq(0, T ;L2(Ω)). (3.7)
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Let {Tk} ⊂ (0, T ) be such that Tk ր T . i.e. Tk is strictly monotone increasing and converges to
T . Denote ϕn ≡ ϕ(·; zn).
(a). For T1, by the observability inequality (3.1), and (3.6),
‖ϕ(T2; zn)‖L2(Ω) ≤ C(1)‖βϕ(·; zn)‖Lq(T2,T ;L2(Ω))
≤ C(1)‖βϕ(·; zn)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ C(1),∀ n ∈ N,
Hence, there exists a subsequence {ϕ1n} of {ϕn} and ϕ01 ∈ L2(Ω) such that
ϕ1n(T2) = ϕ(T2; z1n)→ ϕ01 weakly in L2(Ω).
This together with the fact:

(ϕ1n)t(x, t) + ∆ϕ1n(x, t)− a(x, t)ϕ1n(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T2),
ϕ1n(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T2),
ϕ1n(x, T2) = ϕ(T2; z1n) in Ω,
shows that there exists ψ1 ∈ Lq(0, T2;L2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T2 − δ];L2(Ω)) for all δ > 0, which satisfies

(ψ1)t(x, t) + ∆ψ1(x, t)− a(x, t)ψ1(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T2),
ψ1(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω × (0, T2),
ψ1(x, T2) = ϕ01(x) in Ω,
such that for all δ > 0,
ϕ1n → ψ1 strongly in Lq([0, T2];L2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T2 − δ];L2(Ω)).
In particular,
ϕ1n → ψ1 strongly in Lq([0, T2];L2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T1];L2(Ω)), (3.8)
and
βϕ1n → βψ1 strongly in Lq([0, T2];L2(Ω)). (3.9)
These together with (3.7) and (3.9) yield
βψ1 = ψˆ in L
q([0, T1];L
2(Ω)).
(b). Along the same way as (a), we can find a subsequence {ϕ2n} of {ϕ1n}, and ψ2 ∈
L2([0, T3];L
2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T3 − δ];L2(Ω)) for all δ > 0, which satisfies{
(ψ2)t(x, t) + ∆ψ2(x, t)− a(x, t)ψ2(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T3),
ψ2(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T3),
such that
ϕ2n → ψ2 strongly in Lq([0, T3];L2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T2];L2(Ω)).
This, together with (3.8), leads to
ψ2|[0,T1] = ψ1,
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and
βψ2 = ψˆ in L
q([0, T2];L
2(Ω)).
(c). Similarly to (a) and (b), we can find a sequence {ψk} which satisfies, for each k ∈ N+, that
• ψk ∈ Lq([0, Tk+1];L2(Ω)) ∩C([0, Tk];L2(Ω));
• ψk+1|[0,Tk] = ψk;
• ψk satisfies {
(ψk)t(x, t) + ∆ψk(x, t)− a(x, t)ψk(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, Tk+1),
ψk(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, Tk+1).
• βψk = ψˆ in Lq([0, Tk ];L2(Ω)).
Define
ψ(·, t) = ψk(·, t), t ∈ [0, Tk].
Then, ψ is a well defined on [0, T ), which satisfies ψ ∈ Lq([0, T ];L2(Ω)) ∩ C([0, T );L2(Ω)),{
ψt(x, t) + ∆ψ(x, t)− a(x, t)ψ(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ψ(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
and
βψ = ψˆ = lim
n→∞βϕ(·; zn).
Under an isometric isomorphism, we can say ψ = ψ. This complete the proof of the lemma.
We define the operator T : Y → L2(Ω) by
T (ϕ(·; z)) = ϕ(0; z), ∀ z ∈ L2(Ω), (3.10)
which is well-defined because Y ⊂ C([0, T ];L2(Ω)). Define the operator Tβ,q : βY β,q → L2(Ω) by
Tβ,q(βψ) = ψ(0), ∀ ψ ∈ Y β,q. (3.11)
By lemma 3.4, the operators Tβ,q is also well-defined. In addition, it follows from the observability
inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1 that the linear operator Tβ,q is bounded.
Lemma 3.5. If β ∈ B and q ∈ [1,∞), then the operator Tβ,q defined by (3.11) is compact.
Proof. By the observability inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1, it follows that the operator βY β,q →
L2(Ω) defined by
βψ(·, ·) → ψ(·, T/2), ∀ ψ ∈ Y β,q
is bounded. Also by the property of heat equation, the operator defined by
ϕ(·, T/2) → ϕ(·, 0), ∀ ϕ ∈ Y β,q
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is compact. As a composition operator from the above two operators, Tβ,q is compact as well.
Notice that the functional Vq(β) in (2.3) can be written as
Vq(β) = inf
ψ∈Y
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0,T (ψ) 〉
]
= inf
ψ∈Y β,q
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈 y0,Tβ,q(βψ) 〉
]
= inf
ψ∈Y β,q
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) +
〈T ∗β,qy0, βψ〉Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)),Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
]
= inf
ψˆ∈βY β,q
[
1
2
‖ψˆ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) +
〈
T ∗β,qy0, ψˆ
〉
Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)),Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
]
.
(3.12)
Let
φβ,q = T ∗β,qy0 ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)).
We present an equivalent problem of problem (Min J)β,q (2.3) with the extended domain:
(M̂in J)β,q : inf
ζ∈βY β,q
[
1
2
‖ζ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈φβ,q, ζ 〉
]
. (3.13)
The following result gives a relation between problem (NP )p,β and problem (M̂in J)β,q.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that β ∈ B, y0 ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0}, and q ∈ [1,∞). Then problem (M̂in J)β,q
(3.13) admits a unique nonzero solution ζ¯(x, t), and the control defined by
u¯(x, t) = ‖ζ¯‖2−q
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
‖ζ¯(·, t)‖q−2
L2(Ω)
ζ¯(x, t), ∀ (x, t) ∈ Ω× (0, T ), (3.14)
is an optimal control to problem (NP )p,β. Moreover,
Np(β) = ‖ζ¯‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)). (3.15)
Proof. Since for any q ∈ [1,∞), by the coercive, continuity, and the strict convexity of the
functional in (M̂in J)β,q (3.13), we have that the problem (M̂in J)β,q (3.13) admits a unique solution
ζ¯(x, t). We claim that
ζ¯ 6= 0. (3.16)
If this is not true, we can derive from the Euler-Lagrange equation that
〈φβ,q, ξ 〉 = 0, ∀ ξ ∈ βY β,q.
It then follows from Yβ,q ⊂ Y β,q that
〈 y0, ϕ(0, z) 〉 = 〈φβ,q, βϕ(·; z) 〉 = 0, ∀ z ∈ L2(Ω).
We claim that {ϕ(0, z)|z ∈ L2(Ω)} is dense in L2(Ω). Once the claim holds, the above equality
implies that y0 = 0. This contradiction shows that (3.16) is true.
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Now we show that {ϕ(0, z)|z ∈ L2(Ω)} is dense in L2(Ω). Recalling the dual system (2.1), we
define the operator L in L2(Ω) by
Lz = ϕ(0, z) for any z ∈ L2(Ω).
Notice that
{ϕ(0, z)|z ∈ L2(Ω)} is dense in L2(Ω)⇔R(L) = L2(Ω)⇔ N (L∗) = {0},
where the last equivalence holds because of R(L) = N (L∗)⊥. For any zˆ ∈ L2(Ω), consider the
following equation {
ϕˆt(t)−△ϕˆ(t) + a(t)ϕˆ(t) = 0,
ϕˆ(0) = zˆ.
First, a direct verification shows that
L∗(zˆ) = ϕˆ(T ).
By the backward uniqueness for heat equation, we have N (L∗) = {0}. Second, we claim that
ζ¯(·, t) 6= 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ). (3.17)
Actually, since βY β,q ∈ C([0, T );L2(Ω)), ζ¯(·, t) is well-defined for every t ∈ [0, T ). If there is a
t0 ∈ [0, T ) such that ζ¯(·, t0) = 0, then by Lemma 3.4, there is ϕˆ ∈ C([0, T );L2(Ω)) which solves
(3.5) such that
ζ¯ = βϕˆ.
Since by (3.3),
β(x) ≥
√
α/2 χΩ1 , Ω1 =
{
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ β(x) ≥√α/2}, m(Ω1) > 0,
it follows that
χΩ1ϕˆ(t0) = 0.
By virtue of the unique continuation of heat equation ([3]), we arrive at ϕˆ(·) ≡ 0. This contradicts
with (3.16), and hence (3.17) holds true.
Therefore, the control u¯(x, t) defined by (3.14) is well-defined and u¯(·, ·) ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)).
Now, we show that this control is optimal to problem (NP )p,β (1.7). Since ζ¯(x, t) is optimal, we
can derive the corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation to the variational problem (M̂in J)β,q (3.13)
as follows:
〈 u¯, ξ 〉+ 〈φβ,q, ξ 〉 = 0, ∀ ξ ∈ βY β,q. (3.18)
Taking ξ = βϕ(·; z) for any z ∈ L2(Ω) in (3.18), a straightforward calculation shows that
y(T ;β, u¯) = 0.
If uˆ satisfies
y(T ;β, uˆ) = 0, (3.19)
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we will show that
‖u¯‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ ‖uˆ‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)), (3.20)
from which we see that u¯(·, ·) is an optimal solution to problem (NP )p,β (1.7) and (3.15) holds.
Now, we prove (3.20). By (3.19),
−〈y0, ϕ(0; z)〉 = 〈y(T ;β, uˆ), z〉 − 〈y0, ϕ(0; z)〉 =
∫ T
0
〈βϕ(t; z), uˆ(·, t)〉dt, ∀ z ∈ L2(Ω),
which is rewritten as
−〈φβ,q, ξ 〉 = 〈 uˆ, ξ 〉, ∀ ξ ∈ βYβ,q.
By the density argument, it holds that
−〈φβ,q, ξ 〉 = 〈 uˆ, ξ 〉, ∀ ξ ∈ βY β,q.
It then follows from (3.18) that
〈 u¯, ξ 〉 = 〈 uˆ, ξ 〉, ∀ ξ ∈ βY β,q.
Taking ξ = ζ¯ in above quality, we have
〈 u¯, ζ¯ 〉 = 〈 uˆ, ζ¯ 〉 . (3.21)
On the other hand, it follows from (3.14) that
‖u¯‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) = ‖ζ¯‖2−qLq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
[∫ T
0
∥∥∥‖ζ¯(·, t)‖q−2L2(Ω)ζ¯(·, t)
∥∥∥p dt]
1
p
= ‖ζ¯‖2−q
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
[∫ T
0
‖ζ¯(·, t)‖(q−1)p
L2(Ω)
dt
] 1
p
= ‖ζ¯‖2−q
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
‖ζ¯‖
q
p
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
= ‖ζ¯‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)).
(3.22)
Hence
‖u¯‖2Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) =
∥∥ζ¯∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
= 〈 ζ¯ , u¯ 〉 . (3.23)
By (3.23), (3.21), and (3.22), we have
‖u¯‖2Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) = 〈u¯, ζ¯〉 = 〈uˆ, ζ¯〉 ≤ ‖uˆ‖ · ‖ζ¯‖ = ‖uˆ‖ · ‖u¯‖.
The result ‖u¯‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ ‖uˆ‖Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)) follows immediately because u¯ 6= 0.
Remark 3.7. By the equivalence form (3.12) for problem (Min J)β,q (2.3), and the observability
inequality claimed by Lemma 3.1, it is known immediately that the problem following
inf
ψ∈Y β,q
[
1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) +
〈T ∗β,qy0, βψ〉Lp(0,T ;L2(Ω)),Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
]
(3.24)
admits a unique solution in Y β,q.
14
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Suppose that ζ¯ is an optimal solution of (M̂in J)β,q that
Vq(β) =
1
2
‖ζ¯‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈φβ,q, ζ¯ 〉 .
Replace ξ by ζ¯ in (3.18) to obtain
〈φβ,q, ζ¯ 〉 = −〈 u¯, ζ¯ 〉 .
This, together with (3.23), gives
Vq(β) = −1
2
‖ζ¯‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)).
The result then follows from (3.15).
3.2 The case of two-person Stackelberg game
In this subsection, we solve the game problem (2.8). The first part presents the existence of solution
to (2.8).
3.2.1 Existence of relaxed optimal actuator location
Let
zq = βT ∗β,qy0 ∈ Lp(0, T ;L2(Ω)), Θ =
{
θ ∈ L(Ω; [0, 1])
∣∣∣ ∫
Ω
θ(x)dx = α ·m(Ω)
}
.
It is clear that
β2 ∈ Θ for any β ∈ B and θ1/2 ∈ B for any θ ∈ Θ. (3.25)
Then, the problem (GP1) (2.9) can be transformed into the following equivalent problem:
inf
β∈B
sup
ψ∈Y

−1
2
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
β2(x)ψ2(x, t)dx
)q/2
dt
)2/q
−
∫∫
(0,T )×Ω
zq(x, t)ψ(x, t)dxdt


= inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Y

−1
2
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ2(x, t)dx
)q/2
dt
)2/q
−
∫∫
(0,T )×Ω
zq(x, t)ψ(x, t)dxdt


∆
= inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ)
∆
= inf
θ∈Θ
Fˆ (θ), (3.26)
where the functional F defined on Θ× Y by (2.11) is now given by
F (θ, ψ) = −1
2
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ2(x, t)dx
)q/2
dt
)2/q
−
∫∫
(0,T )×Ω
zq(x, t)ψ(x, t)dxdt, (3.27)
and the functional Fˆ defined on Θ is given by
Fˆ (θ) = sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (3.28)
To solve problem (3.26) which is equivalent to the game problem (GP1) (2.9), we introduce the
following Definitions 3.8-3.10 which can be found in Definition 38.4 on page 149 and Definition 38.5
on page 150, both in [26].
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Definition 3.8. Let Z be a Banach space and let f : M ⊆ Z∗ → R ∪ {+∞} be given. The
functional f is said to be sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous if, for any z ∈ M and each
sequence {zn} ⊆M with
zn → z weakly* in Z∗,
it holds that
f(z) ≤ lim
n→∞
f(zn).
Definition 3.9. Let Z be a topological space. The functional f : M ⊆ Z → R ∪ {+∞} is said to
be lower semi-continuous if, the set
Mr
∆
=
{
z ∈M ∣∣ f(z) ≤ r}
is closed relative to M for any r ∈ R.
Definition 3.10. Let Z be a Banach space and let f : M ⊆ Z∗ → R ∪ {+∞} be given. The
functional f is said to be weakly* lower semi-continuous if, the set Mr is weakly* closed in Z for
any r ∈ R.
The following Propositions 3.11 is brought from Proposition 2.31 of [2, p.62]).
Proposition 3.11. Let Z be a separable Banach space. If f : Z∗ → R ∪ {+∞} is convex, then f
is weakly* lower semi-continuous if and only if f is sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous.
The following Proposition 3.12 comes from the fact:{
z ∈M ∣∣ sup
i∈I
fi ≤ r
}
=
⋂
i∈I
{
z ∈M ∣∣ fi ≤ r} .
Proposition 3.12. Let Z be a topological space and let I be an index set. If
{fi :M ⊆ Z → R ∪ {+∞}, i ∈ I}
is a family of lower semi-continuous functionals, then sup
i∈I
fi is also lower semi-continuous.
The following Proposition 3.13 is actually Theorem 1.6 of [5, p.6].
Proposition 3.13. If r ∈ (0, 1] and
f, g ∈ Lr+ =
{
f ∈ Lr ∣∣ f ≥ 0} ,
then
‖f + g‖Lr ≥ ‖f‖Lr + ‖g‖Lr .
Now, we discuss the existence of solution to problem (3.26). To this end, let X = L∞(Ω) which
is equipped with the weak* topology. In this way, Θ is compact in X.
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Lemma 3.14. Suppose that q ∈ [1, 2] and y0 ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0}. If ψ ∈ Y is given, then the functional
F (·, ψ) :→ R ∪ {+∞} defined by (3.27) is convex.
Proof. By (3.27),
F (θ, ψ) = −1
2
∥∥∥∥
∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ2(x, ·)dx
∥∥∥∥
L
q
2 (0,T ;R)
− 〈 zq, ψ 〉 .
Notice that ∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ2(x, ·)dx ∈ L
q
2
+(0, T ),
where q/2 ∈ (0, 1] for q ∈ [1, 2]. It then follows from Proposition 3.13 that the functional F (·, ψ) is
convex for any q ∈ [1, 2] and ψ ∈ Y .
Lemma 3.15. Suppose that q ∈ [1, 2] and y0 ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0}. If ψ ∈ Y is given, then the functional
F (·, ψ) : Θ→ R ∪ {+∞} defined by (3.27) is sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous.
Proof. If there is a sequence {θn} ∈ Θ such that
θn → θˆ weakly* in L∞(Ω),
then for any ψ ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, T ),
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
θn(x)ψ
2(x, t)dx =
∫
Ω
θˆ(x)ψ2(x, t)dx ≤
∫
Ω
ψ2(x, t)dx.
Since ∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
ψ2(x, t)dx
)q/2
dt <∞,
it follows from the dominated convergence theorem, and (3.27) that
lim
n→∞F (θn, ψ) = F (θˆ, ψ).
The functional F (·, ψ) is therefore sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous.
Theorem 3.16. Suppose that q ∈ [1, 2] and y0 ∈ L2(Ω)\{0}. Then the game problem (GP1) (2.9)
admits a solution in Θ.
Proof. By Lemma 3.15, the functional F (·, ψ) is sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous. It
follows from Proposition 3.11 and Lemma 3.14 that the functional F (·, ψ) is weakly* lower semi-
continuous. Under the topology of X, F (·, ψ) : Θ ⊂ X → R ∪ {+∞} is lower semi-continuous.
Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 3.12 and the definition of Fˆ in (3.28) that Fˆ (·) is also
lower semi-continuous. By the compactness of the domain Θ under the topology of X, there exists
at least one solution to problem (3.26). Therefore, the game problem (GP1) (2.9) admits a solution
in Θ.
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Remark 3.17. The set
P =
{
β2
∣∣ ∫
Ω
β(x)dx ≤ α ·m(Ω), β ∈ L(Ω; [0, 1])
}
is not weakly* closed. For example, let Ω = (0, 2) and α = 1/4 and take β1 =
1
2χ(0,1), β2 =
1
2χ(1,2).
Then β21 ∈ P , β22 ∈ P . Consider a convex combination of β21 and β22 : 12β21 + 12β22 = 1/8 and let
βˆ =
1
2
√
2
. Then βˆ2 = 1/8. However,
∫ 2
0 βˆ(x)dx =
1√
2
≥ 12 . So βˆ2 6∈ P .
3.2.2 Value attainability of the zero-sum game
In this subsection, we will make use of the game theory to discuss the value attainability of our
two-person zero-sum game (3.26). Note that for our problem (3.26),
V + = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ), (3.29)
and
V − = sup
ψ∈Y
inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ), (3.30)
where F is given by (3.27). It is clear that V + is the value of problem (3.26). Once V + = V −, we
can characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium to problem (3.26) by using Proposition 2.5. To this
end, we introduce an intermediate value Vˆ and prove successively that V − = Vˆ under topological
assumptions, and that Vˆ = V + under convexity assumptions.
We denote by K all the finite subsets of Y . For any K ∈ K, set
VK = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈K
F (θ, ψ), Vˆ
∆
= sup
K∈K
VK = sup
K∈K
inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈K
F (θ, ψ). (3.31)
Then
V − ≤ Vˆ ≤ V +. (3.32)
Lemma 3.18. Let q ∈ [1, 2]. Let V + and Vˆ be defined by (3.29) and (3.31) respectively. Then
V + = Vˆ . (3.33)
Proof. For any K = {ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn} ∈ K, since from Lemma 3.15, the functional F (·, ψj) is
sequentially weakly* lower semi-continuous in Θ for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, it follows from the proof
of Theorem 3.16 that there is θK ∈ Θ such that
sup
ψ∈K
F (θK , ψ) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈K
F (θ, ψ).
This together with the definition of Vˆ enables us to derive
F (θK , ψ) ≤ sup
ψˆ∈K
F (θK , ψˆ) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψˆ∈K
F (θ, ψˆ) ≤ sup
Kˆ∈K
inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψˆ∈Kˆ
F (θ, ψˆ) = Vˆ , ∀ ψ ∈ K. (3.34)
For any ψ ∈ Y , denote
Sψ
∆
=
{
θ ∈ Θ ∣∣ F (θ, ψ) ≤ Vˆ } .
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It follows from (3.34) that the set Sψ is nonempty and
{θK} ⊂
⋂
ψ∈K
Sψ 6= ∅. (3.35)
In addition, since F (·, ψ) is weakly* lower semi-continuous, Sψ is weakly* closed in L∞(Ω). In
other words, Sψ is closed under the topology of X. This, together with (3.35), implies that
the intersection of any finite subsets of {Sψ, ψ ∈ Y } is nonempty.
By the compactness of Θ, ⋂
ψ∈Y
Sψ 6= ∅.
Hence, there is θ¯ such that
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ¯, ψ) ≤ Vˆ ,
and so
inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ) ≤ Vˆ .
This, together with (3.32), completes the proof of the lemma.
The following Proposition 3.19 is Proposition 8.3 of [1, p.132].
Proposition 3.19. Let Eˆ and Fˆ be two convex sets and let the function f(·, ·) be defined in Eˆ× Fˆ .
Let F be the set of all finite subsets of Fˆ and
Vˆ = sup
K∈F
inf
x∈Eˆ
sup
ψ∈K
f(x, y), V − = sup
y∈Fˆ
inf
x∈Eˆ
f(x, y).
Suppose that a) for any y ∈ Fˆ , x → f(x, y) is convex; and b) for any x ∈ Eˆ, x → f(x, y) is
concave. Then Vˆ = V −.
Lemma 3.20. Let q ∈ [1, 2] and let V − and Vˆ be defined by (3.30) and (3.31), respectively. Then
Vˆ = V −. (3.36)
Proof. It is clear that both Θ and Y are convex. Let θ ∈ Θ and let β ∈ B be such that β2 = θ.
Since by (3.27),
F (θ, ψ) = −1
2
‖βψ‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) − 〈 zq, ψ 〉,
and∥∥∥∥ψ1 + ψ22
∥∥∥∥
2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
≤ 1
2
‖ψ1‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) +
1
2
‖ψ2‖2Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) , ∀ ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Lq(0, T ;L2(Ω)),
the functional F (θ, ·) is concave for any q ∈ [1,∞) and θ ∈ Θ. On the other hand, it follows from
Lemma 3.14 that the functional F (·, ψ) is convex for any q ∈ [1, 2] and ψ ∈ Y . Apply Proposition
3.19 to obtain (3.36). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Combining the above results, we have proved the following Theorem 3.21.
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Theorem 3.21. Suppose that q ∈ [1, 2] and let V + and V − be defined by (3.29) and (3.30)
respectively. Then
V − = V +. (3.37)
Remark 3.22. In the original problem, there are two important cases. One is p = 2, and the
other is p = ∞. Their corresponding conjugate exponents are q = 2 and q = 1 respectively. It is
fortunate that Theorem 3.21 is valid for both these cases.
3.2.3 Nash equilibrium
The value attainability for a given two-person zero-sum game is a necessary condition to the
existence of the Nash equilibriums. To discuss further about the solution to the Stackleberg game
problem (GP1) (2.9) or equivalently problem (3.29), we need to discuss another Stackleberg game
problem (3.30), in other words, we should discuss the following problem:
inf
ψ∈Y
sup
θ∈Θ

1
2
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ(x, t)2dt
) q
2
dt
)2
q
+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉

 . (3.38)
Define a non-negative nonlinear functional on Y by
NF (ψ) = sup
θ∈Θ
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ(x, t)2dt
) q
2
dt
)1
q
, ∀ ψ ∈ Y. (3.39)
Lemma 3.23. For q ∈ [1,+∞), the functional NF (·) defined by (3.39) is a norm for the space Y
defined by (2.5).
Proof. It is clear that
NF (ψ) ≥ 0, ∀ ψ ∈ Y and ψ = 0⇒ NF (ψ) = 0.
By (3.25),
NF (ψ) = sup
β∈B
‖βψ‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)).
Furthermore, if NF (ψ) = 0, then βψ = 0 for any β ∈ B. By
χ{x∈Ω|β(x)≥
√
α/2}|ψ(x, t)| ≤
β(x)√
α/2
|ψ(x, t)|,
we have
χ{x∈Ω|β(x)≥
√
α/2}ψ = 0.
It then follows from (3.3) and the unique continuation for heat equation ([3]) that ψ = 0. Therefore,
NF (ψ) = 0 if and only if ψ = 0. Finally, a direct computation shows that
NF (cψ) = |c|NF (ψ),∀ ψ ∈ Y, c ∈ R.
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By
‖β(ψ1 + ψ2)‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤ ‖βψ1‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + ‖βψ2‖Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω)),∀ β2 = θ ∈ Θ,
we have (∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)(ψ1(x, t) + ψ2(x, t))
2dt
) q
2
dt
)1
q
≤
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ1(x, t)
2dt
) q
2
dt
) 1
q
+
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ2(x, t)
2dt
) q
2
dt
)1
q
.
So,
NF (ψ1 + ψ2) ≤ NF (ψ1) +NF (ψ2).
This shows that NF is a norm for the space Y .
Definition 3.24. Owing to Lemma 3.23, we can denote the norm given by the functional NF (·)
as ‖ · ‖NF . It is clear that the space (Y, ‖ · ‖NF ) is a normed linear space. We set
(
Yq, ‖ · ‖NF
)
as
the completion space of (Y, ‖ · ‖NF ).
Along the same line in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we have the following Lemma 3.25.
Lemma 3.25. Let 1 ≤ q < ∞. Then under an isometric isomorphism, any element of Yq can be
expressed as a function ϕˆ ∈ C([0, T );L2(Ω)) which satisfies (in the sense of weak solution){
ϕˆt(x, t) + ∆ϕˆ(x, t)− a(x, t)ϕˆ(x, t) = 0 in Ω× (0, T ),
ϕˆ(x, t) = 0 on ∂Ω× (0, T ),
and NF (ϕˆ) = lim
n→∞NF (ϕ(·; zn)) for some sequence {zn} ⊂ L
2(Ω), where ϕ(·; zn) is the solution of
(2.1) with initial value z = zn.
Remark 3.26. By Lemma 3.25, we have the following inclusion:
Yq ⊆ Lq(0, T ;L2(Ω)). (3.40)
Indeed, suppose that n0 ∈ N so that n0 ≥ 1/α. There are n0 measurable subsets ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn0 of
Ω such that
ωj ∈ W, ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n0},
n0⋃
j=1
ωj = Ω.
The inclusion (3.40) then follows from
∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
ψ(x, t)2dx
) q
2
dt ≤
∫ T
0

 n0∑
j=1
∫
Ω
χωj(x)ψ(x, t)
2dx


q
2
dt
≤
∫ T
0

n0 n0∑
j=1
(∫
Ω
χωj (x)ψ(x, t)
2dx
)q
1/2
dt
≤ √n0
∫ T
0
n0∑
j=1
(∫
Ω
χωj(x)ψ(x, t)
2dx
)q/2
dt
(3.41)
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≤ √n0
n0∑
j=1
‖ψ‖qNF = n3/20 ‖ψ‖qNF ,
where the Schwartz’s inequality is used in the second inequality of (3.41) and the last inequality in
(3.41) is derived from
√∑
ai ≤
∑√
ai.
Furthermore, for any β ∈ B, it follows from
‖βψ‖L2(0,T :L2(Ω)) ≤ NF (ψ), ∀ ψ ∈ Y.
that
Yq ⊆ Yβ,q, ∀ β ∈ B. (3.42)
Recalling that Y is dense in Yβ,q and sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ) = sup
ψ∈Yβ,q
F (θ, ψ) with θ = β2, we have
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ) = sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ) = sup
ψ∈Yβ,q
F (θ, ψ). (3.43)
Now, we discuss the following extended game problem of (3.38):
(GP2) :
inf
ψ∈Yq
sup
θ∈Θ

1
2
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ(x, t)2dx
) q
2
dt
) 2
q
+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉


= inf
ψ∈Yq
[
1
2
‖ψ‖2NF + 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉
]
.
(3.44)
Notice that the functional in problem (GP2) (3.44) is strictly convex, coercive, and continuous.
Similarly to Lemma 3.6, we have the following Lemma 3.27.
Lemma 3.27. For any y0 ∈ L2(Ω) \ {0} and q ∈ [1,∞), the game problem (GP2) (3.44) admits a
unique nonzero solution.
Now we present Nash equilibrium problem of two-person zero-sum game:
(GP3) : To find θ¯ ∈ Θ, ψ¯ ∈ Yq such that F (θ¯, ψ¯) = sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ¯, ψ) = inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ¯), (3.45)
where F (θ, ψ) is defined by (3.27). The following Theorem 3.28 is about the existence of the Nash
equilibrium to the two-person zero-sum game problem (GP3) (3.45).
Theorem 3.28. Let q ∈ [1, 2] and let ψ¯ be a solution to problem (GP2) (3.44). Then problem
(GP3) (3.45) admits at least one Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if β¯ is a relaxed optimal actuator
location to problem (1.8), then (θ¯ = β¯2, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium to problem (GP3) (3.45). Con-
versely, if (θˆ, ψˆ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (GP3) (3.45), then ψˆ = ψ¯, and βˆ = θˆ1/2 is a
relaxed optimal actuator location to problem (1.8).
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Proof. In terms of (3.43),
V + = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Y
F (θ, ψ) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ). (3.46)
Notice that
V − = sup
ψ∈Y
inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ) ≤ sup
ψ∈Yq
inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ).
It follows from Theorem 3.21 that
inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ) = sup
ψ∈Yq
inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ). (3.47)
Furthermore, by (3.46) and (3.25),
if β¯ is a solution to problem (GP1) (2.9), then θ¯ is a solution to inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ);
if θ¯ is a solution to inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ), then β¯ is a solution to problem (GP1) (2.9),
(3.48)
where θ¯ = β¯2. Recalling Proposition 2.5, we have the following results:
• Equation (3.47) ensures that problem (GP3) attains its value;
• Problem (GP2) (3.44) admits a unique solution ψ¯ by Lemma 3.27;
• Problem (GP1) (2.9) admits a solution by Theorem 3.16 and (3.48).
It follows from Proposition 2.5 that problem (GP3) admits at least one Nash equilibrium. Further-
more, if θ¯ is a solution to inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ), then (θ¯, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium to problem (GP3).
Conversely, if (θˆ, ψˆ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (GP3), then θˆ is a solution to problem
inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ψ∈Yq
F (θ, ψ) and ψˆ solves sup
ψ∈Yq
inf
θ∈Θ
F (θ, ψ). By the uniqueness from Lemma 3.27, it holds that
ψˆ = ψ¯. That, together with (3.48) and the equivalence between problem (1.8) and problem (GP1),
Theorem 3.28 is derived directly.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. If p ∈ [2,+∞], then q ∈ [1, 2] and vice verse. Notice that (θˆ, ψˆ) is a Nash
equilibrium of problem (GP3) if and only if (βˆ, ψˆ) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (1.10), where
βˆ2 = θˆ. By a direct verification, Theorem 1.1 follows from Theorem 3.28.
Remark 3.29. For any Nash equilibrium to problem (GP3) in Theorem 3.28, the second compo-
nent ψ¯ is the unique solution to problem (GP2) (Lemma 3.27). Thus for any solution β¯ to problem
(1.8), the set
{
ψˆ ∈ Yq
∣∣ (β¯, ψˆ) is a Nash equilibrium} defined in (1.11) is a singleton and indepen-
dent of β¯. Thus for any solution β¯ to problem (1.8), (β¯, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (1.10).
By the definition of Nash equilibrium, β¯ solves the following problem:
sup
β∈B
[
1
2
∥∥βψ¯(·)∥∥2
Lq(0,T ;L2(Ω))
+ 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉
]
.
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Equivalently, β¯ solves problem (1.12). We thus have all results of Remark 1.2.
If β¯ is a relaxed optimal actuator location, then (β¯, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium of problem (1.10).
So β¯ is optimal for this fixed ψ¯. However, if there is βˆ such that βˆ is optimal for the fixed ψ¯,
we can not derive that ψ¯ is also optimal for this βˆ. Therefore, we can not say that βˆ is also a
relaxed optimal actuator location. This implies that the condition in Remark 1.2 is only a necessary
condition.
3.3 Optimal actuator location for the case of p = 2
Though we have derived the existence for the relaxation problem, the existence of the optimal
actuator location to the classical problem (1.4) is still not known. A key problem leading the
relaxation solution to the existence of the classical problem (1.4) is whether the following equality
holds:
inf
β∈B
Np(β) = inf
ω∈W
Np(ω)? (3.49)
To establish this equality, we need to learn more about the optimal a relaxed actuator location β¯.
Recall Remark 1.2 that if β¯ is relaxed actuator location, then β¯ solves problem (1.12). Thus θ¯ = β¯2
solves
sup
θ∈Θ
(∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ¯(x, t)2dt
) q
2
dt
)2
q
.
That is to say,
∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ¯(x)ψ¯(x, t)2dt
) q
2
dt = sup
θ∈Θ
∫ T
0
(∫
Ω
θ(x)ψ¯(x, t)2dt
) q
2
dt. (3.50)
In this subsection, we limit ourselves to the case of p = 2. We show that when p = 2, the equality
(3.49) is indeed valid, which relies on the fact that the integration orders in equation (3.50) with
respect to the variables t and x can be exchanged.
First of all, we present a preliminary result about the following problem
sup
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)φ(x)dx, (3.51)
where φ(·) ∈ L1(Ω). To this purpose, we define, for any φ ∈ L1(Ω) and c ∈ R, that
Ω[φ ≥ c] = {x ∈ Ω ∣∣ φ(x) ≥ c} , Ω[φ = c] = {x ∈ Ω ∣∣ φ(x) = c} ,
Ω[φ > c] =
{
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ φ(x) > c} , Ω[φ < c] = {x ∈ Ω ∣∣ φ(x) < c} . (3.52)
Let
Mφ(c) = m(Ω[φ ≥ c]) for any φ ∈ L1(Ω) and c ∈ R. (3.53)
It is clear that the function Mφ(c) is monotone decreasing with respect to c. By
lim
ε→0+
Ω[φ ≥ c− ε] =
⋂
ε>0
Ω[φ ≥ c− ε] = Ω[φ ≥ c],
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we have
lim
ε→0+
Mφ(c− ε) =Mφ(c), ∀ c ∈ R. (3.54)
This shows that Mφ(·) is continuous from the left for any given φ ∈ L1(Ω). Since
lim
c→+∞Mφ(c) = 0, limc→−∞Mφ(c) = m(Ω),
the real cφ given by
cφ = max
{
c ∈ R ∣∣Mφ(c) ≥ α ·m(Ω)} , (3.55)
is well-defined. Hence
Mφ(cφ) ≥ α ·m(Ω) ≥Mφ(cφ+) ∆= lim
ε→0+
Mφ(cφ + ε), (3.56)
and
Mφ(cφ + ε) < αm(Ω), ∀ ε > 0. (3.57)
Let
α¯φ
∆
=
Mφ(cφ)
m(Ω)
, αφ
∆
=
Mφ(cφ+)
m(Ω)
. (3.58)
It follows from (3.56) that
α¯φ ≥ α ≥ αφ. (3.59)
Since
lim
ε→0+
Ω[φ ≥ c+ ε] =
⋃
ε>0
Ω[φ ≥ c+ ε] = Ω[φ > c],
it follows that
Mφ(cφ+) = m(Ω[φ > cφ]).
By the definition of αφ in (3.58),
m(Ω[φ > cφ]) = αφ ·m(Ω). (3.60)
This, together with (3.58) and (3.59), implies that
m(Ω[φ = cφ]) = (α¯φ − αφ)m(Ω) ≥ (α− αφ)m(Ω). (3.61)
The following result is about problem (3.51).
Lemma 3.30. Let φ(·) ∈ L1(Ω). Then the problem (3.51) admits a solution θ¯(x) = χω(x) ∈ W.
Moreover, the function θ¯(·) ∈ Θ is a solution to problem (3.51) if and only if it satisfies the following
two conditions
θ¯(x) = 1,∀ x ∈ Ω[φ > cφ] a.e. and θ¯(x) = 0,∀ x ∈ Ω[φ < cφ] a.e. (3.62)
where cφ is defined by (3.55). As a consequence, the problem (3.51) admits a slolution χω ∈ W if
and only if θ¯(x) = χω(x) satisfies (3.62).
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Proof. For any θ(·) ∈ Θ, it holds that
∫
Ω
θ(x)φ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
θ(x)φ(x)dx+ cφ
∫
Ω[φ=cφ]
θ(x)dx+
∫
Ω[φ<cφ]
θ(x)φ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx−
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
(1− θ(x))φ(x)dx+ cφ
∫
Ω[φ=cφ]
θ(x)dx+
∫
Ω[φ<cφ]
θ(x)φ(x)dx
≤
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx−
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
(1− θ(x))cφdx+ cφ
∫
Ω[φ=cφ]
θ(x)dx+
∫
Ω[φ<cφ]
θ(x)φ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx− αφm(Ω) · cφ + cφ
∫
Ω[φ≥cφ]
θ(x)dx+
∫
Ω[φ<cφ]
θ(x)φ(x)dx
≤
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx− αφm(Ω) · cφ + cφ
∫
Ω[φ≥cφ]
θ(x)dx+ cφ
∫
Ω[φ<cφ]
θ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx− αφm(Ω) · cφ + cφ
∫
Ω
θ(x)dx
=
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx+ (α− αφ)m(Ω) · cφ
(3.63)
In (3.63), the third equation comes from (3.60). Hence
sup
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)φ(x)dx ≤
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx+ (α− αφ)m(Ω) · cφ. (3.64)
If θ¯ ∈ Θ and (3.62) holds, then it follows from (3.60) that∫
Ω[φ=cφ]
θ¯(x)dx = (α− αφ)m(Ω). (3.65)
This, together with (3.62), implies that∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx+ (α− αφ)m(Ω) · cφ =
∫
Ω
θ¯(x)φ(x)dx.
Thus θ¯ is a solution and
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)φ(x)dx =
∫
Ω[φ>cφ]
φ(x)dx+ (α− αφ)m(Ω) · cφ. (3.66)
For each measurable subset E of Ω[φ = cφ] with
m(E) = (α− αφ)m(Ω),
define
θˆ = χΩ[φ>cφ]∪E.
A direct computation shows that θˆ ∈ W and (3.62) holds. Thus problem (3.51) admits a solution
in W. On the other hand, if θˆ is a solution, we can derive (3.62) by (3.66) directly. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
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Remark 3.31. Define a set-valued operator O : L1(Ω)→ 2Θ as follows:
For any φ ∈ L1(Ω), θ ∈ O(φ) if and only if θ ∈ Θ and condition (3.62) holds. (3.67)
By Lemma 3.30, it is easy to verify that θ solves problem (3.51) if and only if θ ∈ O(φ), in other
words,
O(φ) is the solution set to problem (3.51). (3.68)
Now we discuss the game problem (GP2) (3.44) for p = q = 2, that is,
(GP4) :
inf
ψ∈Y2
sup
θ∈Θ
[
1
2
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
θ(x)|ψ(x, t)|2dxdt+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉
]
= inf
ψ∈Y2
max
θ∈Θ
[
1
2
〈 θ,Gψ 〉+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉
]
,
(3.69)
where the operator G : L2(Ω× (0, T ))→ L1(Ω) is defined by
Gψ(x) =
∫ T
0
|ψ(x, t)|2dt, x ∈ Ω a.e. (3.70)
by (3.40), G is well-defined in the space Y2.
Proposition 3.32. Let the operator G and the set-valued operator O be defined by (3.70) and
(3.67), respectively. If ψ¯ is a solution to (GP4) (3.69), then βˆ ∈ B is a solution to problem (1.8)
if and only if θˆ = βˆ2 ∈ Θ solves problem (3.51) with φ = Gψ¯, i.e.
θˆ ∈ O(Gψ¯). (3.71)
Proof. The necessity follows from Theorem 1.1. For the sufficiency, we suppose (3.71). The
remaining proof will be split into two steps.
Step 1. Define a nonlinear functional F in L1(Ω) by
F(g) = 1
2
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)g(x)dx, ∀ g ∈ L1(Ω).
Then, we can rewrite problem (GP4) (3.69) as the following problem:
inf
ψ∈Yq
(F(Gψ) + 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉) . (3.72)
Since ψ¯ is a solution to problem (3.72),
lim
ε→0+
1
ε
[F(Gεψ+ψ¯) + 〈 y0, (εψ + ψ¯)(0) 〉 −F(Gψ¯)− 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉] = 0,∀ ψ ∈ Y2. (3.73)
Denote
f¯ =
∫ T
0
ψ¯(·, t)2dt = Gψ¯, and fψ =
∫ T
0
ψ¯(·, t)ψ(·, t)dt,∀ ψ ∈ Y2. (3.74)
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Then for any ψ ∈ Y2,
lim
ε→0+
1
ε
[F(Gεψ+ψ¯)−F(Gψ¯)]
= lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
[
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)dx
∫ T
0
[|ψ¯(x, t)|2 + 2εψ¯(x, t)ψ(x, t) + ε2|ψ(x, t)|2] dt
−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)dx
∫ T
0
|ψ¯(x, t)|2dt
]
= lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
[
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)dx
[∫ T
0
|ψ¯(x, t)|2dt+ 2ε
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψ(x, t)dt
]
−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)dx
∫ T
0
|ψ¯(x, t)|2dt
]
= lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
[
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
]
=
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx,
where in above the last step, we applied Lemma 3.33 and used the fact
Γf¯ =
{
γ ∈ L∞(Ω[f¯ = cf¯ ]; [0, 1])
∣∣∣∣
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx = (α− αf¯ ) ·m(Ω)
}
.
This, together with (3.73), implies that∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉 = 0, ∀ ψ ∈ Y2. (3.75)
For any ψˆ ∈ Y2, it follows from (3.75) that∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt
+ 〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉 = 0;
−
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx
∫ T
0
−ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt
−〈 y0, ψ¯(0) 〉 = 0.
(3.76)
Therefore,
sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt = inf
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt,
and ∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψˆ(x, t)dt is identical to be constant in Ω[f¯ = cf¯ ] for any fixed ψˆ ∈ Y2. (3.77)
Step 2. We claim that
(θˆ, ψ¯) is a Nash equilibrium to problem (GP4) (3.69) for any θˆ ∈ O(f¯). (3.78)
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To obtain (3.78), it follows from (3.43) that we need only to prove that ψ¯ solves the following
problem:
inf
ψ∈Yβ,2
[
1
2
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
θˆ(x)ψ(x, t)2dxdt+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉
]
, (3.79)
or equivalently, βψ¯ solves
inf
ζ∈βYβ,2
[
1
2
‖ζ‖2L2(0,T ;L2(Ω)) + 〈Tβ,2 y0, ζ〉
]
, (3.80)
where β = θˆ1/2 ∈ B.
On the other hand, since (3.80) is a quadratic optimization problem, ψ¯ is a solution if and only
if ψ¯ satisfies the following Euler-Lagrange equation:∫
Ω
θˆ(x)dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψ(x, t)dt + 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉 = 0,∀ ψ ∈ Yβ,2.
Since Y ⊂ Y2 ⊂ Yβ,2, and Y is dense in Yβ,2, we have∫
Ω
θˆ(x)dx
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)ψ(x, t)dt + 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉 = 0, ∀ ψ ∈ Y2. (3.81)
To show that ψ¯ is a solution, we only need to prove (3.81). By (3.67),
θˆ(x) = 1 when x ∈ Ω[f¯ > cf¯ ], θˆ(x) = 0 when x ∈ Ω[f¯ < cf¯ ].
Thus (3.81) can be written as∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
θˆ(x)fψ(x)dx+ 〈 y0, ψ(0) 〉 = 0, ∀ ψ ∈ Y2.
By θˆ ∈ O(f¯) and (3.65), it follows that
χΩ[f¯=cf¯ ]θˆ ∈ Γf¯ .
This, together with (3.77), implies that∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
θˆ(x)fψ(x)dx = sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx, ∀ ψ ∈ Y2. (3.82)
Equation (3.81) then follows from (3.75) and (3.82). That is, ψ¯ is a solution to (3.79). This proves
(3.78).
Finally, it follows from Theorem 3.28 that βˆ = θˆ1/2 is a relaxed optimal actuator location.
Denote
supp θ =
{
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ θ(x) 6= 0} , ∀ θ ∈ L1(Ω). (3.83)
Lemma 3.33. Let Ω[φ ≥ c], Ω[φ = c], Ω[φ < c], and let Mφ(c), cφ, α¯φ, αφ, f¯ , fψ be defined by
(3.52), (3.53), (3.55), (3.58), (3.74), respectively. Then
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
=
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx,
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where
Γf¯ =
{
γ ∈ L∞(Ω[f¯ = cf¯ ]; [0, 1])
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)dx = (α− αf¯ ) ·m(Ω)
}
. (3.84)
To prove this lemma, we need the following results.
Lemma 3.34. Let Ω[φ ≥ c], Ω[φ = c], Ω[φ < c], and let Mφ(c), cφ, α¯φ, αφ, f¯ , fψ Γf¯ be defined by
(3.52), (3.53), (3.55), (3.58), (3.74), (3.84) respectively. Then
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≥
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+ sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx.
(3.85)
Proof. Considering Ω[f¯ = cf¯ ] in (3.85) as Ω in problem (3.51), and noticing m(Ω[f¯ = cf¯ ]) ≥
(α− αf¯ )m(Ω), we obtain, from Lemma 3.30, that
sup
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx
admits a solution which is denoted as γ¯, i.e.∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ¯(x)fψ(x)dx = max
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx. (3.86)
We claim that θ¯ = χΩ[f¯>cf¯ ]
+ γ¯ ·χΩ[f¯=cf¯ ] ∈ Θ, and∫
Ω
θ¯(x)f¯(x)dx = max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx. (3.87)
Actually, by (3.60), it follows that
m(Ω[f¯ > cf¯ ]) = αf¯ ·m(Ω).
This, together with γ¯ ∈ Γf¯ , implies that θ¯ ∈ Θ. So the claim follows from Lemma 3.30.
By virtue of (3.87) and (3.86), we have
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≥ lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(∫
Ω
θ¯(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−
∫
Ω
θ¯(x)f¯(x)dx
)
=
∫
Ω
θ¯(x)fψ(x)dx =
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+max
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx.
This proves inequality (3.85).
To estimate
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
,
we need the following Lemma 3.35.
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Lemma 3.35. Let Ω[φ ≥ c], Ω[φ = c], Ω[φ < c], and let Mφ(c), cφ, α¯φ, αφ, f¯ , fψ be defined by
(3.52), (3.53), (3.55), (3.58), (3.74), respectively. Let δ > 0 and denote by
Iδ = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx, II
δ = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωˆδ,ε\Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx. (3.88)
Then
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤ Iδ + IIδ, (3.89)
In addition,
Iδ ≤
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+6δ]
fψ(x)dx. (3.90)
Proof. Let δ > 0 be fixed and denote f ε = f¯ + 2εfψ for any ε > 0. Notice that
Ωδ,ε
∆
= Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ + 6δ]
⋂
Ω[fψ ≥ −δ/ε]
⊂ Ω[f ε ≥ cf¯ + 4δ]
⊂ Ω[f¯(x) ≥ cf¯ + 2δ]
⋃
Ω[fψ ≥ δ/ε].
(3.91)
It follows from (3.91) and (3.57) that
lim
ε→0+
m(Ω[f ε ≥ cf¯ + 4δ])
≤ lim
ε→0+
(
m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ + 2δ]) +m(Ω[fψ ≥ δ/ε])
)
≤ m (Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ + 2δ]) < αm(Ω).
So there is ε(δ) > 0 such that
m(Ω[f ε ≥ cf¯ + 4δ]) < αm(Ω), ∀ ε ≤ ε(δ). (3.92)
We claim that : for ε ∈ (0, ε(δ)), if θε ∈ O(f ε), i.e. θε ∈ Θ solves
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx,
then
θε ≥ χΩδ,ε . (3.93)
Actually, by (3.91), we only need to prove that
θε ≥ χE0 with E0
∆
=Ω[f ε ≥ cf¯ + 4δ].
If this is false, then there exist θ0 ∈ O(f ε) and E1 ⊂ E0 such that
m(E1) > 0 and θ0(x) < 1, a.e. x ∈ E1. (3.94)
By (3.94) and (3.92),
λ = min
{∫
E1
(1− θ0(x))dx,
∫
Ω\E0
θ0(x)dx
}
> 0.
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So there are E2 ⊂ E1 and E3 ⊂ Ω \E0 such that∫
E2
(1− θ0(x))dx =
∫
E3
θ0(x)dx = λ. (3.95)
Take
θ˜0 = χΩ\(E2∪E3)θ0 +χE2 .
It follows from (3.95) that∫
Ω
θ˜0(x)dx =
∫
Ω
(
χΩ\(E2∪E3)θ0(x) +χE2
)
dx
=
∫
Ω
θ0(x)dx−
∫
E2
θ0(x)dx−
∫
E3
θ0(x)dx+
∫
E2
dx
=
∫
Ω
θ0(x)dx = αm(Ω),
(3.96)
i.e., θ˜0 ∈ Θ. Moreover, by recalling E0 = Ω[f ε ≥ cf¯ + 4δ], we have
f ε(x) ≥ cf¯ + 4δ, a.e. x ∈ E2 ⊂ E0.
This, together with (3.95), yields∫
Ω
θ˜0(x)f
ε(x)dx =
∫
Ω
(
χΩ\(E2∪E3)θ0 +χE2
)
(x)f ε(x)dx
=
∫
Ω\(E2∪E3)
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx+
∫
E2
f ε(x)dx =
∫
Ω\E3
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx+
∫
E2
(1− θ0(x))f ε(x)dx
≥
∫
Ω\E3
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx+
∫
E2
(1− θ0(x))
(
cf¯ + 4δ
)
dx
=
∫
Ω\E3
θ0f
ε(x)dx+
(
cf¯ + 4δ
) ∫
E3
θ0(x)dx.
Note that
f ε(x) < cf¯ + 4δ, a.e. x ∈ E3 ⊂ Ω \ E0.
The above two inequalities imply that
∫
Ω
θ˜0(x)f
ε(x)dx >
∫
Ω\E3
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx+
∫
E3
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx =
∫
Ω
θ0(x)f
ε(x)dx.
By θ˜0 ∈ Θ from (3.96), the above inequality contradicts with θ ∈ O(f ε). Thus the claim follows.
Set
df¯ = inf
{
d ∈ R ∣∣ m(Ω[f¯ ≤ d]) ≥ (1− α)m(Ω)} . (3.97)
Since for any r > 0, m(Ω[f¯ ≤ df¯ − r]) < (1− α)m(Ω), so
m(Ω[f¯ ≥ df¯ − r]) ≥ m(Ω[f¯ > df¯ − r]) > αm(Ω). (3.98)
This, together with (3.55), implies that df¯ − r ≤ cf¯ for all r > 0, and hence cf¯ ≥ df¯ .
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Since
Ω[f¯ ≤ d] =
⋂
ε>0
Ω[f¯ ≤ d+ ε],
it has
m(Ω[f¯ ≤ d]) = lim
ε→0+
m(Ω[f¯ ≤ d+ ε]).
By (3.97), the infimum defining df¯ can be reached. Thus
m(Ω[f¯ ≤ df¯ ]) ≥ (1− α)m(Ω).
By the definition of cf¯ , m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) ≥ αm(Ω). Therefore,
m({x ∈ Ω ∣∣ df¯ < f¯(x) < cf¯}) = m(Ω)−m(Ω[f¯ ≤ df¯ ])−m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ])
≤ m(Ω)− (1− α)m(Ω)− αm(Ω) = 0.
i.e.,
m
({
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ df¯ < f¯(x) < cf¯}) = 0. (3.99)
Furthermore,
Ω[f¯ ≥ df¯ − 2δ]
⋂
Ω[fψ ≥ −δ/ε]
⊂ Ω[f ε ≥ df¯ − 4δ]
⊂ Ω[f¯(x) ≥ df¯ − 6δ]
⋃
Ω[fψ(x) ≥ δ/ε].
(3.100)
It then follows from (3.100) and (3.98) that
lim
ε→0+
m
(
Ω[f ε ≥ df¯ − 4δ]
)
≥ lim
ε→0+
m
(
Ω[f¯ ≥ df¯ − 2δ]
⋂
Ω[fψ ≥ −δ/ε]
)
= m
(
Ω[f¯ ≥ df¯ − 2δ]
)
> αm(Ω).
So there is εˆ(δ) > 0 such that
m
(
Ω[f ε ≥ df¯ − 4δ]
)
> αm(Ω), ∀ ε ≤ εˆ(δ). (3.101)
Let
Ωˆδ,ε
∆
=Ω[f¯(x) ≥ df¯ − 6δ]
⋃
Ω[fψ(x) ≥ δ/ε].
Similarly to the proof of Claim 2, we have from (3.101) and (3.100) that for any θε ∈ O(f ε),
θε ≤ χΩˆδ,ε when ε ∈ (0, εˆ(δ)). (3.102)
Choosing ε to satisfy
0 < ε < min{ε(δ), εˆ(δ)},
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it follows from (3.102) and (3.88) that
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤ lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(∫
Ω
θε(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−
∫
Ω
θε(x)f¯(x)dx
)
= lim
ε→0+
∫
Ω
θε(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωˆδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
≤ lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx+ lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωˆδ,ε\Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx = I
δ + IIδ.
Thus the inequality (3.89) holds. Now, by (3.93), θε(x) = 1 for almost all x ∈ Ωδ,ε. It then follows
from (3.91) and the dominated convergent theorem that
Iδ = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+6δ]
χ[fψ≥−δ/ε]fψ(x)dx ≤
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+6δ]
fψ(x)dx.
Thus the inequality (3.90) holds and the proof is over.
Lemma 3.36. Let Ω[φ ≥ c], Ω[φ = c], Ω[φ < c], and let Mφ(c), cφ, α¯φ, αφ, f¯ , fψ Γf¯ be defined by
(3.52), (3.53), (3.55), (3.58), (3.74), (3.84) respectively. Then
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
[
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
]
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+max
γ∈Γf¯
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
γ(x)fψ(x)dx.
(3.103)
Proof. By the definition of cf¯ given in (3.55),
either m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) > αm(Ω) or m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) = αm(Ω).
This, together with cf¯ ≥ df¯ , implies that there are three possible cases:
a) cf¯ = df¯ ;
b) cf¯ > df¯ and m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) = αm(Ω);
c) cf¯ > df¯ and m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) > αm(Ω).
First, we exclude the case c). We suppose that this case is true and obtain a contradiction.
Actually, by definition (3.97) for df¯ ,
m(Ω[f¯ ≤ (cf¯ + df¯ )/2]) ≥ (1− α)m(Ω).
This, together with m(Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ]) > αm(Ω), implies that
m(Ω) ≥ m(Ω[f¯(x) ≤ (cf¯ + df¯ )/2])+m(Ω[f¯(x) ≥ cf¯ ])> (1− α)m(Ω) + αm(Ω) = m(Ω).
So the case c) is impossible. We only discuss the first two cases.
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Second, we discuss the case a). Notice that
lim
ε→0+
Ωˆδ,ε = Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ − 6δ], limε→0+Ω
δ,ε = Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ + 6δ].
Setting
Ω˜δ
∆
=Ω
[
cf¯ − 6δ ≤ f¯ < cf¯ + 6δ
]
, (3.104)
we have
lim
ε→0+
Ωˆδ,ε \ Ωδ,ε = Ω˜δ.
So
χΩˆδ,ε\Ωδ,ε → χΩ˜δ strongly in L1(Ω), (3.105)
and
χΩˆδ,ε\Ωδ,εfψ → χΩ˜δfψ strongly in L1(Ω). (3.106)
Suppose that there is a sequence {εδn, n ∈ N} converging to zero such that
lim
n→∞
∫
Ωˆδ,ε
δ
n\Ωδ,εδn
θε
δ
n(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωˆδ,ε\Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx.
Since {θεδn} ⊂ L∞(Ω; [0, 1]), there is a subsequence, still denoted by itself without confusion, such
that
θε
δ
n → θ˜δ weakly* in L∞(Ω), (3.107)
and θ˜δ ∈ L∞(Ω; [0, 1]). This, together with (3.106), implies that
lim
n→∞
∫
Ωˆδ,ε
δ
n\Ωδ,εδn
θε
δ
n(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
θε
δ
n(x)
(
χ
Ωˆδ,ε
δ
n\Ωδ,εδn fψ
)
(x)dx =
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx.
Therefore,
IIδ = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ωˆδ,ε\Ωδ,ε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx =
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx. (3.108)
On the other hand, by (3.102), supp θε ⊂ Ωˆδ,ε, and so
αm(Ω) =
∫
Ω
θε(x)dx =
∫
supp θε
θε(x)dx =
∫
Ωˆδ,ε
θε(x)dx.
This, together with the fact
χ
Ωˆδ,ε
δ
n
→ χΩ[f¯≥cf¯−6δ] strongly in L
1(Ω),
implies that ∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯−6δ]
θ˜δ(x)dx = lim
n→∞
∫
Ωˆδ,ε
δ
n
θε
δ
n(x)dx = αm(Ω). (3.109)
Now, we claim that
θ˜δ ≥ χΩ[f¯≥cf¯+6δ]. (3.110)
Indeed, since
lim
n→∞Ω
δ,εδn = Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ + 6δ],
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it follows from (3.93) that
〈 g, θ˜δ 〉 = lim
n→∞ 〈 g, θ
εδn〉L1(Ω),L∞(Ω) ≥ lim
n→∞〈g, χΩδ,εδn 〉
= 〈g, χΩ[f¯≥cf¯+6δ] 〉, ∀ g ∈ L
1(Ω; [0,∞)).
Thus (3.110) holds true.
Now recall (3.89). By (3.90) and (3.108),
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+2δ]
fψ(x)dx+
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx, ∀ δ > 0.
Therefore,
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤ lim
δ→0+
(∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+2δ]
fψ(x)dx+
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx
)
=
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx+ lim
δ→0+
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx.
(3.111)
Suppose that there is a sequence {δn} such that
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω˜δn
θ˜δn(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
δ→0+
∫
Ω˜δ
θ˜δ(x)fψ(x)dx.
Since {θ˜δn} ⊂ L∞(Ω; [0, 1]), there is a subsequence, still denoted by itself, such that
θ˜δn → θ¯ weakly* in L∞(Ω),
and θ¯ ∈ L∞(Ω; [0, 1]). By (3.104),
χΩ˜δnfψ → χΩ[f¯=cf¯ ]fψ strongly in L
1(Ω).
Thus
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω˜δn
θ˜δn(x)fψ(x)dx =
∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)fψ(x)dx. (3.112)
With replacement of fψ by 1, we can obtain along with (3.109) and (3.110) that∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)dx = lim
n→∞
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯−6δn]
θ˜δn(x)dx = αm(Ω),
and
m(Ω[f¯ > cf¯ ]) ≥
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)dx = lim
n→∞
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+6δn]
θ˜δn(x)dx
≥ lim
n→∞
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯+6δn]
dx = m(Ω[f¯ > cf¯ ]) = αf¯m(Ω).
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Therefore, ∫
Ω[f¯=cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)dx =
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)dx−
∫
Ω[f¯>cf¯ ]
θ¯(x)dx = (α− αf¯ )m(Ω).
This, together with (3.111) and (3.112), gives inequality (3.103).
Third, we consider the case b) for cf¯ > df¯ and m
(
Ω[f¯(x) ≥ cf¯ ]
)
= α ·m(Ω). By Lemma 3.30,
there exists θε ∈ W such that θε ∈ O(f ε). By Lemma 3.30, it follows that
θε(x)


= 1 when f ε(x) > cfε ;
= 0 or = 1 when f ε(x) = cfε ;
= 0 when f ε(x) < cfε .
Hence
f ε(x) ≥ cfε ≥ f ε(y),∀ x ∈ supp θε a.e. and y ∈ Ω \ supp θε a.e., (3.113)
and
m(supp θε) = αm(Ω). (3.114)
Let
Aε =
{
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ f¯(x) ≥ cf¯ , fψ(x) > −cf¯ − df¯4ε
}
, Bε =
{
x ∈ Ω ∣∣ f¯(x) ≤ df¯ , fψ(x) < cf¯ − df¯4ε
}
.
Then
f ε(x) >
cf¯ + df¯
2
> f ε(y), ∀ x ∈ Aε and y ∈ Bε a.e. (3.115)
Furthermore,
lim
ε→0
Aε = Ω[f¯ ≥ cf¯ ], lim
ε→0
Bε = Ω[f¯ ≤ df¯ ].
This, together with (3.99), implies that
lim
ε→0
m(Aε) = α ·m(Ω), lim
ε→0
m(Ω \ (Aε ∪Bε)) = 0. (3.116)
We claim that
lim
ε→0
m(Aε ∩ supp θε) = α ·m(Ω). (3.117)
To see this, for each ε > 0, there is at least one of the following two cases to be valid:
m (Aε ∩ (Ω \ supp θε)) = 0 or m (Bε ∩ (supp θε)) = 0. (3.118)
Otherwise, there exists some ε0 > 0 such that
m (Aε0 ∩ (Ω \ supp θε0)) 6= 0, m (Bε0 ∩ (supp θε0)) 6= 0.
Notice that
Aε0 ∩ (Ω \ supp θε0) ⊂ Ω \ supp θε0, Bε0 ∩ (supp θε0) ⊂ supp θε0 .
It follows from (3.113) that
f ε0(x) ≤ f ε0(y) for almost all x ∈ Aε0 ∩ (Ω \ supp θε0) and y ∈ Bε0 ∩ (supp θε0).
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This contradicts with (3.115).
If there is a sequence {εn} such that m (Aεn ∩ (Ω \ supp θεn)) = 0, then we have (3.117) by
virtue of (3.116).
If there is a sequence {εn} such that m (Bεn ∩ (supp θεn)) = 0, then, for any n ∈ N,
m (Bεn ∩ (supp θεn)) = 0⇒ m (Bεn ∩ (Ω \ supp θεn)) = m (Bεn)
⇒ m ((Ω \Bεn) ∪ supp θεn) = m (Ω \Bεn)
⇒ m(((Ω \Bεn) ∩Aεn) ∪ ((Ω \Bεn) \ Aεn) ∪ supp θεn)= m(((Ω \Bεn) ∩Aεn) ∪ ((Ω \Bεn) \ Aεn))
⇒ m ((Aεn ∪ supp θεn) ∪ (Ω \ (Aεn ∪Bεn))) = m (Aεn ∪ (Ω \ (Aεn ∪Bεn))) ,
where the last assertion above follows from m (Aεn ∩Bεn) = 0 by virtue of (3.115). Furthermore,
the last assertion above, likely (3.116), implies that
lim
n→∞m(A
εn ∪ supp θεn) = lim
n→∞m(A
εn).
Thus
lim
n→∞m(A
εn ∩ supp θεn) = lim
n→∞m(supp θ
εn)− lim
n→∞m(supp θ
εn \ Aεn)
= lim
n→∞m(supp θ
εn)−
(
lim
n→∞m(A
εn ∪ supp θεn)− lim
n→∞m(A
εn)
)
= lim
n→∞m(supp θ
εn) = αm(Ω).
Therefore (3.117) is true.
By (3.116)-(3.117) and (3.114), it holds that
lim
ε→0
m (Aε \ supp θε) = lim
ε→0
m (supp θε \ Aε) = 0.
By the absolute continuity of the Lebesgue integral,
lim
ε→0+
∫
Aε\supp θε
|fψ(x)|dx = lim
ε→0+
∫
supp θε\Aε
|fψ(x)|dx = 0.
Thus
lim
ε→0+
∣∣∣∣
∫
supp θε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx−
∫
Aε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
ε→0+
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Aε\supp θε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
supp θε\Aε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ lim
ε→0+
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Aε\supp θε
|fψ(x)|dx
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
supp θε\Aε
|fψ(x)|dx
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= 0.
(3.119)
With the similar argument, we can prove that
lim
ε→0+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Aε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx−
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯ ]
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0. (3.120)
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By (3.119) and (3.120),
lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(
max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−max
θ∈Θ
∫
Ω
θ(x)f¯(x)dx
)
≤ lim
ε→0+
1
2ε
(∫
Ω
θε(x)
(
f¯(x) + 2εfψ(x)
)
dx−
∫
Ω
θε(x)f¯(x)dx
)
= lim
ε→0+
∫
Ω
θε(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
ε→0+
∫
supp θε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
= lim
ε→0+
∫
Aε
θε(x)fψ(x)dx = lim
ε→0+
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯ ]
θε(x)fψ(x)dx
≤
∫
Ω[f¯≥cf¯ ]
fψ(x)dx.
(3.121)
Moreover, it follows from the assumption m
(
Ω[f¯(x) ≥ cf¯ ]
)
= α ·m(Ω) that Γf¯ is a singleton. Thus
(3.121) gives (3.103).
Proof of Lemma 3.33. Combining Lemmas 3.34 and 3.36, we obtain Lemma 3.33 immediately.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. By Proposition 3.32 and Lemma 3.30, we see that when ω ∈ W, χω
solves problem (1.8) if and only if
χω ∈ O(Gψ¯).
Moreover, there must have an ω¯ ∈ Ω such that χω¯ solves problem (1.8). By the optimality of χω¯,
it follows from (1.8) that
N2(χω¯) = inf
β∈B
N2(β).
Notice that
N2(χω¯) ≥ inf
ω∈W
N2(χω), inf
ω∈W
N2(χω) ≥ inf
β∈B
N2(β).
We thus have
inf
ω∈W
N2(χω) = inf
β∈B
N2(β).
Therefore, if χω solves problem (1.8), then ω must be an optimal actuator location of problem
(1.4). Notice that χω ∈ O(Gψ¯) is equivalent to ω solving
sup
ω∈W
‖χω f¯‖2L2(Ω), with f¯(x) =
∫ T
0
ψ¯(x, t)dt.
Using Proposition 3.32 again, we can derive the results of Theorem 1.3.
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